Abstract: In this paper, we introduce considerations of farsightedness into Hermida-Rivera's (2024) setup. Crucially, we assume that voters only care about the voting rules and constitutions that will not be subject to further changes (i.e., they only care about the long run). Moreover, we add a natural monotonicity axiom to the non-dominance, anonymity, null voter, and swing voter axioms used by Hermida-Rivera (2024) to characterise voters' preferences over voting rules. We then identify farsighted stable voting rules and constitutions, where a constitution is a pair of voting rules: one for ordinary issues, and one for amendments. The key conclusion is that considerations of farsightedness do not enlarge the families of minimal stable voting rules and minimal self-stable constitutions.
Author: Héctor HERMIDA-RIVERA & Toygar T. KERMAN.
Keywords: voting, stability, farsightedness.
JEL Codes: D71, D82.