[1] GENOVESE, F & HERMIDA-RIVERA, H. (2022). "Government Partisanship & Bailout Conditionality in the European Financial Crisis". International Interactions, 48.5 pp.  897 - 935.

The political economy literature on international bailouts has repeatedly shown that the domestic politics of rescued countries influence international bailout compliance. However, we know less about the domestic politics of bailout negotiations, and especially the type of conditions negotiated by governments of more developed countries with strong ties to international lenders. This paper puts forward an argument about the role of a government's partisanship in shaping the conditions stipulated between international lenders and developed countries when crises confront the latter. Consistent with political cover theories, we argue that governments of crisis countries seek to scapegoat international institutions in order to push domestically unpleasant reforms. However, when crises affect countries significantly close to international lenders, international institutions may tolerate the scapegoating attitude and accept to emphasize governments' reforms in the direction of their core ideological constituencies. Focusing on bailout negotiations during the Eurocrisis (2008-2016), we maintain that while important and painful reforms were discussed at the negotiation tables, the involved international lenders also accommodated the policy preferences of both left and right governments of crisis-ridden countries, everything else constant. So, conditionality came with duress, but governments were also able to emphasize reforms on the opponents' policy issues, hence systematically obtaining fewer measures on their voters' main policy areas. Regression analyses of an original country-quarter dataset of EU bailout conditionality measures provide support to our hypothesis. The findings are relevant to the analysis of partisan politics in economic negotiations and of democratic deficits in international organizations. Furthermore, this study contributes to understanding the political accessibility and ideological dynamics of international lending beyond the Eurocrisis.


[4] HERMIDA-RIVERA, H. (2022). "Stable Simple Games".

PhD Thesis Chapter III [Job Market Paper].

In this paper, I introduce a novel notion of stability for simple games. In Theorem 1, I show that if players’ utility function satisfies three natural axioms, a simple game is stable in Nash equilibria if and only if it has a unique minimal winning coalition. In Theorem 2, I show that if players’ utility function satisfies one additional axiom, the set of stable simple games in undominated Nash equilibria contains the set of simple games with a unique minimal winning coalition and is contained in the set of simple games with veto players. In Theorems 3 to 6, I use these results to partially characterise the set of self-stable constitutions, where a constitution is a pair of simple games: an ordinary one for routine issues, and an extraordinary one for amendments.

[3] HERMIDA-RIVERA, H. (2022). "An Implementation of Cooperative Solutions".

PhD Thesis Chapter II.

Abstract available soon.

[2] HERMIDA-RIVERA, H. (2022). "A Generalised Implementation Problem".

PhD Thesis Chapter I.

In this paper, we generalise the classical implementation problem by introducing an exogenous set of social choice functions whose realisations determine the set of feasible outcomes in every state. In Remarks 1 to 3, we provide a set of simple yet dire conclusions regarding the (weak) implementability of rules by means of feasible (and exhaustive) mechanisms. We then introduce the notion of support, and show in Theorems 1 & 2 that a rule is (weakly) supportable if and only if there exists an equivalent problem whose set of feasible outcomes is the original exogenous set of social choice functions. In Theorems 3 & 4, we derive simpler necessary and sufficient conditions for supportability.

[1] HERMIDA-RIVERA, H. (2022). "Bargaining Foundations of Consistent Values".

MPhil Thesis..

This paper shows that any consistent and efficient solution function can be written in a simple recursive fashion (Theorem 1). It then relies on this formulation to provide bargaining foundations in subgame perfect equilibria for any efficient, consistent and extended individually rational solution function in the domain of cooperative games with transferable utility (Theorem 2). Hence, this paper provides non-cooperative foundations for the Shapley Value (Theorem 3) and the Prenucleolus (Theorem 4). The key element of our bargaining procedure is that after the removal of a rejected proponent, the remaining players play a subgame in which the desired cooperative solution is consistent.