MINIMAL STABLE VOTING RULES
Abstract: in this paper, I characterise minimal stable voting rules and minimal self-stable constitutions (i.e., pairs of voting rules) for societies in which only power matters. To do so, I first let voters’ preferences over voting rules satisfy four natural axioms commonly used in the analysis of power: non-dominance, anonymity, null voter and swing voter. I then provide simple notions of minimal stability and minimal self-stability, and show that the families of minimal stable voting rules and minimal self-stable constitutions are fairly small. Finally, I conclude that political parties are often key to the minimal self-stability of otherwise not minimal self-stable constitutions.
Author(s): Hector Hermida-Rivera.
Keywords: voting rules, constitutions, minimal, stability, self-stability, power.
JEL Codes: D71, D72.
Word count: 7,016.
Status: under review.
Preprint: available here.